Imagine the headlines: "New Bin Laden Fatwa forbids attacks against the West" or "Bin Laden denounces terrorism." Too absurd? Could be. However, the number of processes we now call "de-radicalization" does not mean that.
Of radicalization is a relative change process in which a group of radical, violent behavior and reverses of abandoning ideology to legitimize-the use of violent methods to achieve political objectives, while also moving towards a gradual acceptance of social policy and economic changes within a pluralistic context. It even applies to armed Islamists? Yes, yes - in a fairly large scale.
Several armed movements, factions and individual activists have shown a remarkable transformation and ideological behavior towards non-violence. The processes of "de-radicalization" of these movements eliminated tens of thousands of former militants from the ranks of supporters of al Qaeda and acted as a disincentive for would-be militants. These processes have been carried out on a large scale (levels of the organization in Egypt, Algeria, Tajikistan, and a relatively small scale (levels of factions and individuals) in the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia - among others.
Too many questions arise: Why? Conditions? Impact? I can not answer them all here. However, previous research on the processes of radicalization, it is concluded that a combination of charismatic leadership, state repression, interactions with the "other" as well as within the organization, and selective incentives by the state and other actors are common causes of radicalization.
There is a pattern of interaction between these factors that ultimately the radicalization of many of the cases mentioned above, as well as non-Islamists of cases. State repression and interaction with the "other" often affect the ideas and behavior of the leadership of an armed and probably lead them to initiate three endogenous processes: strategic calculations, political learning and worldview (s ) review (s).
The first process is based on the calculations of rational choice and cost-benefit analysis. The second process is a product of socialization and interaction with the "other". Leadership beliefs are updated and re-evaluate their behavior due to the conduct of its interaction partner (s). The third process is largely based on perception and psychological factors. It is a process in which the leadership of an armed Islamist movement changed their view of the world as a result of serious crisis, frustration and dramatic changes in the environment.
Following these processes, leadership is a process of radicalization, which is reinforced by selective incentives by the state, as well as internal interactions (conferences, debates, meetings between the leaders, mid-level commanders, and bases in an effort to convince about the merits of radicalization).
In addition, de-radicalized groups often interact with violent Islamist groups and in some cases, the old influence of the last (domino effect). Such interaction is well demonstrated in the Islamic Group and Al-Jihad Organization in Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) and other small Islamist militias and factions of the GIA and the GSPC in Algeria and de-Islamist radical figures and individual suspects in Saudi Arabia.
So what should we do from here - both wise policy and research? Well, for starters, this is a little studied phenomenon not only in security studies, but also in sociological, political, Islamic, and the area.
