Mario Uribe Escobar, cousin of the president of Colombia and Colombia Democratic party leader, politics, announced the removal of the two congressional candidates, Rocío Arias and Eleonora Pineda, of his party on February 2 for their support to outside organizations paramilitaries. His announcement comes at the tail of a purge of a limited number of political candidates who are known to support Colombia's paramilitary organizations.
The two candidates are in a long list of politicians who privately admit that the close contact with the commanders. Arias and Pineda are considered the most public faces of a major effort and deep pockets to increase political paramilitary control at the national level through the next congressional elections to be held on Sunday, March 12.
A much smaller, more organized and influential group of former paramilitaries has become warlords. As a group, they began to exercise power in the world of politics a year ago city and state level. Their efforts were first recorded in the 2002 parliamentary elections. In these elections, candidates backed paramilitaries won over 90 percent of the vote, in many cases because there was no opposition candidate on the ticket and were afraid voters to abstain.
Through these strong-arm tactics, paramilitary organizations have begun to increase the number of politicians who control the Congress of Colombia. On this occasion, which look set to further increase that power. If they succeed, they will work to prohibit extradition, the eradication of its worst fears, while solidifying their position of power through numerous departments of Colombia. It is a fact that severely hinders democracy and sets of Colombia and the region on the path to less stability in the foreseeable future.
Paramilitary Politics
The departments of Colombia, which extends from Panama to Venezuela along the northern coast of the country have long been in the hands of the commanders who act both publicly and behind the scenes to control political candidates municipal levels, governor, and national levels. His strong political influence in the hands of coastal states, like Cesar, Guajira, Atlantico, Magdalena and Cordoba, is more evident, according to German Espejo, an analyst at Bogota-based Security and Democracy Foundation.
Mirror agree that the bottom of the paramilitaries and support for congressional elections. "In addition to financial support, it is possible that the paramilitaries to use their influence to obstruct the campaigns of candidates who do not support," said Espejo ISN Security Watch.
Claudia Lopez, Colombian journalist and Development Program (UNDP), consultant, concludes a study published in December 2005, which had a close look at the intersection of paramilitary control departments in northern Colombia and rates of landslide victories of political candidates in these areas. Their findings revealed atypical voting behavior in parliamentary elections in 2002 in the areas that have experienced high levels of related paramilitary massacres, and therefore is under paramilitary control, had been unopposed political candidates who were elected with over 90 percent of the vote.
The Colombian newspaper El Tiempo reported that the department of paramilitary-dominated Magdalena, mayoral candidates ran unopposed in 14 of the 30 municipalities in the department. The tendency of candidates to run unopposed, winning with inflated percentages of the vote has been repeated in numerous departments of Colombia. The trend, known as "paramilitarization" has been documented in the Colombian press and noted on the floor of the Colombian Congress.
Alvaro Sierra published a column in El Tiempo September 25, 2004 in which he declared that Colombia was becoming aware of the fact that "a substantial part of the country, the daily lives of millions of people, politics, the economy, and local government budgets, and an unknown amount of power and influence at the level of central government institutions like Congress, is in the hands of paramilitaries. "
Colombian Senator Carlos Moreno de Caro, vice-president of the Senate's Peace Commission, highlighted in the press in Colombia in March 2005 when he defended the measure as one to give lenient treatment paramilitary disarmament negotiations in , saying "the thing is that half the country is theirs."
Adam Isacson, director of programs with the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC, said Senator Moreno de Caro's statement was an exaggeration, but not a savage.
"Declaration of Salvatore Mancuso that the paramilitaries control more than 30 percent of the Colombian Congress was probably inflated," said Isacson. "But after the next election may be closer to the truth," he told ISN Security Watch.
Ineffective pre-election purge
Relatively few candidates publicly admit to their alliances with paramilitaries, however, many of them privately admit these links. This has created a "do not ask, do not tell" situation that has made it difficult for President Uribe to act on complaints from the opposition. Many fingers point in the public evidence, but little sustained complaints.
Paramilitary control of politics is a reality that some can digest and others can not. In the runup to the elections of March 12, many opposition candidates publicly demanded that President Uribe to do something to purge the lists of political candidates, the elimination of people believe that, in close collaboration with paramilitary leaders.
A great purge of political candidates suspected of links with the paramilitaries was more likely in the minds of U.S. ambassadorWilliam Wood, when in December 2005 stated publicly. "Corrupt electoral practices may occur in the 2006 elections, especially the paramilitary" Uribe told him to stop "meddling" in Colombian affairs.
Weeks later, at a meeting in Cordoba on January 9, Uribe public found very heated discussion between two senatorial candidates in the department of paramilitary control. Each claimed the other had made political pacts with paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso. Days later, Uribe asked the Attorney General of Colombia to investigate the senators links to the paramilitaries.
That same week, Gina Parody, a congressman from Bogota, declined invitations to stand as a candidate for one of the two main pro-Uribe political party, Partido de la U and Radical Change. He explained that his decision not to run with any of the parties is based on the fact that both parties are candidates "with links to paramilitaries."
She named Merheg Dieb Maloof and Habib, both running for re-election as candidate of the U. Maloof is believed to be a partner Jorge 40, leader of the Northern Bloc, one of the largest and most powerful organizations paramilitaries. Merheg has been suspected of links with the paramilitaries since 2003. Both were elected to Congress in 2002 as members of the party Colombia Viva, a political organization believed to be close to the paramilitaries.
On January 18, the wave of accusations and investigations came to a head. Both U Party and Radical Change expelled a total of five candidates from their ranks. However, these candidates were quickly absorbed by smaller pro-Uribe political parties, to the disappointment of the opposition candidates who supported the purges. Even after the very public removal of Rocío Arias and Eleonora Pineda, both candidates were absorbed by smaller pro-Uribe political organizations.
Power on extradition
What U.S. has been an ambassador of wood - and many others in Colombia - is concerned not only before elections and para bleed more. The 2006 elections can be placed in Congress enough power for politicians paramilitaries illegal extradition.
A law prohibiting the extradition represents a de facto victory of paramilitary organizations in Colombia. The U.S. has made nine requests for extradition of paramilitary leaders. All are immune to extradition under the protection of the disarmament process, but no definite assurance that it will not be extradited.
The prohibition of extradition is the focus of all the paramilitary leaders play political power.
If the Colombian government ran out of the bargaining power of extradition, the question of ultimate justice of human rights atrocities, drug trafficking and other crimes remain in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Colombian justice system, no one knows that have much success with Colombian criminals in the past. This system can definitely handle again in the future and paramilitary leaders are willing to assume.
Paramilitary influence in the Congress of Colombia, ultimately goes beyond extradition. Put organized crime in Colombia on the brink of the ultimate tool to protect itself - control over the legislative process.
With control over the legislative process, legally protected paramilitary leaders contribute to massacres and escalation of conflict with the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Its status as warlords consolidated.
Increased drug trafficking and weapons are secure. Exploitation of the rural poor in Colombia on behalf of the elite class making rich and powerful landowner grow.
This reality concentrates wealth in power in the hands of a few, exploitation of others. It would consolidate many more years of uncertainty, both for Colombia and the region. And it promises a future where security - Uribe number one goal - in Colombia becomes a mirage. Paramilitary "king makers" rule from regional posts that contribute to a de facto "Balkanization" of the country and a weakening of state sovereignty and democracy. If the paramilitaries come to control the legislative process in the Congress of Colombia, a country ruled by warlords is a reality that might happen, and there is little that the Colombian government, or any other government, can do to prevent .
